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By VIVIAN DEBORAH WILSON*
"[A]nd no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause... and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized."1
To the colonists, it was anathema that the officers of the King,
under the authority of the general warrant, could invade the sanc-
tity of their homes. "Thus our houses and even our bed chambers,
are exposed to be ransacked, our boxes chests & trunks broke open
ravaged and plundered by wretches .... Officers [who] under col-
our of law and the cloak of a general warrant break thro' the sa-
cred rights of the Domicil .... "' Although outrage has faded in
300 years, the warrant requirement retains enduring force and it
still is articulated as our preference that "inferences [of probable
cause] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enter-
prise of ferreting out crime." Necessity, however, has tempered
our sense of the primacy of the warrant, as progress produced
* Associate Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law. B.A., Hunter College; M.S.,
Columbia University;, J.D., 1969, Hastings College of the Law. The author wishes to ac-
knowledge the valuable assistance of Carolyn S. Sanborn in the preparation of this Article.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. B. ScHwARTz, THz BiLL OF RIGHTS: A DocumzNTARY HISTORY 206 (1971) (quoting a
list of rights and demands prepared by colonists in 1772). See generally Amsterdam, Per-
spectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MmN. L. REv. 349 (1974); Kamisar, A Defense of
the Exclusionary Rule, 15 CRim. L. BuLL. 5 (1979); Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an
"Illogical" or "Unnatural" Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 62 JUDICATURE 66
(1978); Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. Rav. 1027 (1974); La
Fave, Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court: Further Ventures Into the "Quag-
mire," 8 CPnm. L. BULL. 9 (1972); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 665 (1970); Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42
U. Cm. L. REv. 47 (1974); Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?,
50 Tzx. L. REv. 736 (1972).
3. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
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events requiring an officer to conduct intrusions without present-
ing any particular description of the place, person, or thing in-
volved-indeed, often without possessing a warrant at all. To that
end, courts have devised exceptions to the warrant requirement so
that warrantless searches and seizures on probable cause may be
conducted when an emergency arises,4 when circumstances de-
mand,5 when incident to a valid arrest," when an officer legiti-
mately present observes a seizable object in plain view,7 when the
party or owner of the object or place to be searched consents," or
when the "effect" to be seized and subsequently searched is an au-
tomobile.9 The automobile has been held to be "constitutionally
different" 10 from a house, not only because it is said to be invested
with fewer of the characteristics of a sanctuary, but also because it
is viewed as an object rather than a place.1
The "automobile exception" began with the observation that
an officer having probable cause to search a vehicle capable of mo-
tion could reasonably expect the vehicle to vanish promptly if the
officer delayed to secure a warrant. 2 Depending on the circum-
stances, the mobility of the automobile could constitute sufficient
urgency to justify dispensing with the warrant. 3 Even in the ab-
4. "Emergency Searches. An officer who has reasonable cause to believe that premises
or a vehicle contain (1) individuals in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm; or
(2) things imminently likely to burn, explode, or otherwise cause death, serious bodily harm,
or substantial destruction of property;, or (3) things ... which will cause or be used to cause
death or serious bodily harm if their seizure is delayed, may, without a search warrant, enter
and search such premises and vehicles, and the individuals therein, to the extent reasonably
necessary for the prevention of such death, bodily harm, or destruction." ALI MODEL CODE
OF PRE-ARMAGNMNT PROCEDURE § SS 260.5 (1975).
5. When officers are in "hot pursuit" of a suspect, see Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967); to prevent the destruction of evidence, see Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
6. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
7. Officers who are legitimately present pursuant to a warrant may seize objects read-
ily identifiable as fruits of suspected criminal activity, contraband, instrumentalities, or evi-
dence. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). In Coolidge, a plurality of the
Court stated that the discovery must be inadvertent. Whether or not the discovery must be
inadvertent remains a matter of conjecture. See, e.g., North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 301,
502 P.2d 1305, 104 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1972).
8. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). Consent searches are governed
by the same standards whether the place searched is an automobile, a home, or an office.
Consequently, this Article does not discuss consent searches.
9. See notes 22-125 & accompanying text infra.
10. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 151 (1925).
11. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974).
12. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 146, 153 (1925).
13. In the unlikely event that the officer could not arrest the car's driver, it realisti-
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sence of such exigency, however, the United States Supreme Court
has permitted the warrantless seizure and search of an automobile
on the pretext of exigency,14 as well as on the grounds that, as a
mode of transportation subject to pervasive government regulation,
the automobile enjoys a diminished expectation of privacy, thus
justifying minimal intrusions. 15 A line of California cases has devel-
oped an additional rule permitting the warrantless seizure of an
automobile when the automobile is "itself evidence," rather than a
container for evidence of the crime for which the defendant has
been arrested.16
More recently, the courts have begun to define limits more
precisely, identifying those "automobile searches" that have noth-
ing to do with an automobile except that one "lurks somewhere in
the picture. '1 7 Unfortunately, this complicates the issue with addi-
tional inconsistencies, so that the only observation that can be
made with any accuracy is that the same search may require a war-
rant, or permit dispensing with the warrant, depending on the rule
applied. Furthermore, the search of the same automobile may jus-
tify seizing one object within it and not another.18
It is imperative to define the automobile exception to the war-
rant requirement with precision. Appropriate distinctions must be
drawn between occasions when police, pursuing the legitimate
objectives of law enforcement, must be allowed to seize and search
an automobile without a warrant and occasions when the balance
must weigh against authorizing the warrantless intrusion.
This Article analyzes the incongruities in the automobile ex-
ception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment as
currently defined by the United States Supreme Court. In its char-
acterization of the automobile as an "effect," the Court has failed
to perceive its more significant status as a place. An automobile is
cally could be expected that the car and driver would flee the jurisdiction.
14. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970).
15. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1976).
16. See notes 56-99 & accompanying text infra.
17. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1 (1977); People v. Dalton, 24 Cal. 3d 850, 598 P.2d 467, 157 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1979);
People v. Minjares, 24 Cal. 3d 410, 591 P.2d 514, 153 Cal. Rptr. 224 (1979).
18. If the car is searchable as "itself evidence" of a crime, rather than as a container,
the upholstery may be torn apart for evidence that the car is being used to transport contra-
band. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). A suitcase on the back seat,
however, may not be opened without a warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1 (1977).
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not primarily an object that performs a function or accomplishes
an act. It is, more importantly, a site, a location, an area. An auto-
mobile can be a repository for documents, 9 or the scene of a com-
mercial transaction between its occupants. 0 It can even function
as a home. Warrantless searches of automobiles are, therefore,
more appropriately justified according to the standard for the war-
rantless searches of other places-houses, offices, and public
areas.
2 1
The Article offers a proposal defining the circumstances in
which the warrantless automobile search may withstand traditional
analysis of all its phases-the legitimacy of the initial intrusion,
the scope of the subsequent search, whether immediate or delayed,
and the distinctions compelled by the character of the automobile
as a place rather than an object-either as a container of the seiza-
ble item or as the scene of the crime.
Analysis of Warrantless Automobile Searches
Probable Cause and Exigent Circumstances
The basic rule to justify a warrantless automobile search re-
quires a coincidence of probable cause and exigent circumstances.
Where the facts of a particular encounter fail to satisfy these crite-
ria, however, the Court has allowed probable cause alone without
facts of exigency to justify a warrantless search.2 2
Until the 1920's, the automobile did not figure prominently, if
at all, as the object of a search. In the first decade of the 20th
century, automobiles in the United States numbered fewer than
200,000.23 In these early years, the automobile was viewed as a nov-
elty and a luxury. When prohibition was enacted the course of his-
tory changed; "[a]n automobile [became] an almost indispensable
19. See People v. Laursen, 8 Cal. 3d 192, 501 P.2d 1145, 104 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1972).
20. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
21. See generally Moylan, The Automobile Exception: What It Is and What It Is
Not-A Rationale in Search of a Clearer Label, 27 MERCER L. REv. 987 (1976); Murray &
Aitken, Constitutional Limitations on Automobile Searches, 3 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 95 (1970);
West, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles and the Supreme Court from
Carroll to Cardwell: Inconsistently Through the Seamless Web, 53 N.C.L. REv. 722 (1975);
Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 HARv. L. REv. 835 (1974).
22. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 46-52 (1970). See notes 35-55 & accompanying
text infra.
23. S. SEARs, THE AMRIcAN HUERrTAGE HISTORY OF THE AuTomOBnLE IN AmECA 95
(1977).
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instrumentality in large-scale violation of the National Prohibition
Act . . . and the car itself therefore was treated somewhat as an
offender and became contraband." 24 The mobility of the automo-
bile created an exigency justifying warrantless intrusions; police of-
ficers with probable cause to search an automobile traveling on the
open highway were required to do so promptly or risk losing the
"fleeting target."2 5
In Carroll v. United States26 federal officers patrolling a Mich-
igan highway in search of violators of the National Prohibition Act
observed the Carroll automobile, gave chase, effected a stop, and
searched the vehicle, seizing contraband hidden in the upholstery.
The defendant subsequently was convicted, with the contraband
offered as one of the items of evidence at trial.
On review, the Supreme Court found that probable cause ex-
isted to justify the warrantless search, denying that "the right to
search, and the validity of the seizure [were] dependent on the
right to arrest. ' 27 Rather, "the facts and circumstances within the
officers' knowledge ... were sufficient... to warrant. . . the be-
lief that intoxicating liquor was being transported," that is, suffi-
cient to justify a search.' The question, however, remains: was a
warrantless search justified?
The offense, Carroll's first, was only a statutory misdemeanor
24. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 586 (1948). The bootleg cases arose while the
Court was in the process of developing its rationale for upholding warrantless searches. The
Court went no further than to assert that it is within the legitimate function of law enforce-
ment officers to seize vehicles suspected of transporting illegal liquor. See, e.g., Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (federal agents stopped known bootlegger driving heavily
loaded car into a state in which laws prohibited the sale of intoxicants and searched and
seized liquor after suspect admitted that he was carrying twelve cases); Scher v. United
States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938) (police set up stake-out on basis of confidential information;
search yielding 88 bottles of liquor justified as incidental to arrest); Husty v. United States,
282 U.S. 694 (1931) (acting on tip, police observed car until defendant and others appeared,
whereupon the officers made their arrest and searched the automobile; justified on grounds
of probable cause); cf. United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927) (Coast Guard patrol boat
seized small motor boat and 71 cases of alcohol after observing cases on deck while boat was
in area frequented by liquor smugglers; justified on grounds of probable cause).
25. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970).
26. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
27. Id. at 158.
28. Id. at 162. Whether probable cause sufficient to obtain a search warrant existed
prior to the encounter is questionable. If not, it might well be that there was sufficient
probable cause to search at the moment the car was stopped. In that case, there would have
been insufficient reason to make a felony arrest until the search, preceding the arrest, had
occurred. The evidence found in the resulting search could not be used to justify the earlier
arrest which would then justify the search that followed.
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for which an arrest could not be made unless the offense was com-
mitted in the officer's presence.2 9 Until the contraband was discov-
ered, therefore, no violation had occurred in the officer's presence
and Carroll could not be detained. It was the necessity of releasing
Carroll who could be expected to vanish promptly if the officers
delayed while securing a warrant that created the exigency. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that the fourth amend-
ment guarantees had historically been construed as "recognizing a
necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling or house
or other structure. . . and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or
automobile ... where it is not practicable to secure a warrant be-
cause the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or juris-
diction in which a warrant must be sought."30 Therefore, as long as
the essential, identifying characteristic of an automobile is its mo-
bility, exigency is presumed, and nothing more than a showing of
probable cause is necessary to justify an immediate on-the-scene
search without a warrant.
The Carroll Court's imputation of exigency to automobile
searches fails to consider the practical realities of such a search. It
does not appear to concern the Court that mobility can only rarely
be demonstrated; in the usual case, the car's occupants have been
arrested and detained in police custody and the automobile has,
indeed, been immobilized. For that reason, the Court's attempts to
discover exigency have reached inconsistent conclusions depending
on such factors as the late hour of the search,s' the location of the
automobile on an open highway or in a public parking lot,3 2 or the
unavailability of a custodian for the car.33 The result has been in-
consistency in the rationale and reasoning utilized by the courts.34
29. Id. at 164 (McReynolds & Sutherland, J.J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 153.
31. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 n.10 (1970).
32. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 594-95 (1974).
33. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 443 (1973).
34. In People v. Dumas, 9 Cal. 3d 871, 512 P.2d 1208, 109 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1973), the
exigency requirement was fulfilled by the police officer's unexpected discovery that the de-
fendant possessed a vehicle and by the possibility that another person present at the time of
arrest could remove the car or destroy the evidence. Id. at 885, 512 P.2d at 1218, 190 Cal.
Rptr. at 314. A thorough search pursuant to a warrant had failed to yield contraband in
Dumas' apartment. When the officers became aware of the suspect's car parked on the street
near the building, they suspected that Dumas "had probably hidden the easily movable
stolen property in his automobile." Id. The car, which was not mentioned in the warrant,
was searched and the contraband found. The California Supreme Court in justifying the
search assigned to the automobile a "less intense and insistent" expectation of privacy. Id.
[Vol. 32
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If a warrantless automobile search can be justified by the mo-
bility of the vehicle, there would appear to be no impediment to
permittihg police officers to seize the car, transport it to the police
garage, and conduct a delayed search. Such was the case in Cham-
bers v. Maroney.35 After the arrest of its occupants for a gas sta-
tion robbery, the automobile involved was driven to the police sta-
tion where a thorough search of its interior produced evidence
concealed in a compartment under the dashboard. The Supreme
Court in Chambers first declined to justify the warrantless search
as incident to the arrest, stating:
Once an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search
made at another place without a warrant is simply not incident to
the arrest.. . . [Tihe reasons that have been thought sufficient to
justify warrantless searches carried out in connection with an ar-
rest no longer obtain when the accused is safely in custody at the
station house.3
Finding that the same facts providing probable cause for the arrest
would also justify the search, the Court relied on the Carroll rule
that sufficient justification could be founded on probable cause and
the automobile's character as a "fleeting target," adding that
"there is little to choose in terms of practical consequences be-
tween an immediate search without a warrant and the car's immo-
bilization until a warrant is obtained.
3 7
Chambers thus develops the following proposition: if the cir-
cumstances justify a warrantless search at the initial moment of
contact, then that search assumes a continuing justification ex-
tending in time and place, so that days may elapse and miles ac-
crue without dissipating the original justification for the search.
The corrollary to this proposition is that if police officers can, with-
out a warrant, search an area within a suspect's immediate control
as incident to an arrest, it should be possible to conduct that iden-
tical, warrantless search at the officer's convenience at the police
garage under the theory of continuing justification.
Although such an extension of the warrant exception does not
at 882, 512 P.2d at 1216, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 312. Somewhat inconsistently, however, the court
later seemed to deny that very categorization by observing that "the vehicle was certainly a
likely hiding place." Id. at 885, 512 P.2d at 1218, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
35. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
36. Id. at 47 (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1967)).
37. 399 U.S. at 52. Inquiring "which is the greatest and which is the lesser intrusion,"
the Court concluded it was debatable. Id. at 51. Justice Harlan, writing for the dissent,
disagreed. Id. at 63-64 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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appear to be any more objectionable than the theory of continuing
probable cause, there is no reason for it. The necessity for a war-
rantless search does not apply once time has elapsed. Furthermore,
the Chambers holding does not dispose of the critical question of
whether the warrantless search of the automobile would have been
justified in the first place. The car qualified as a "fleeting target"
only momentarily; as soon as the suspects were arrested, the emer-
gency ended. Thus, once the car was safely impounded, there ap-
pears to have been no reason for the officers' failure to secure a
warrant."
Subsequent cases have continued to justify delayed warrant-
less searches, failing to acknowledge that without the mobility fac-
tor of Carroll, Chambers should not apply. Whether "there is little
[choice] between an immediate search without a warrant and the
car's immobilization until a warrant is obtained"' 9 is an inquiry
that should not be invoked if the facts do not support the first
condition: the factual necessity for an immediate search without a
warrant.
In the California case of People v. Laursen,40 witnesses ob-
served the suspects abandon the getaway car at the scene of the
crime after being unable to start it. Having probable cause to
search the car, officers towed it to the impound garage where a
search of the trunk produced documents leading to Laursen's ar-
rest and conviction.
The California Supreme Court upheld the search, which had
been both delayed and warrantless, "because of [the automobile's]
distinguishing characteristics of mobility, even though in otherwise
similar circumstances a search of a fixed structure may be unrea-
38. "Vehicular Searches. Reasonable Cause. An officer who has reasonable cause to
believe that a moving or readily movable vehicle, on a public way or waters or other area
open to the public or in a private area unlawfully entered by the vehicle, is or contains
things subject to seizure under the provisions of Sections 210.3, may, without a search war-
rant, stop, detain, and search the vehicle and may seize things subject to seizure discovered
in the course of the search .... NOTE The Section embodies the substance of the rule,
based on Carroll v. United States, that a vehicle may be searched without a warrant, if the
officer undertaking the search has probable cause to believe that the vehicle is or contains
things properly subject to seizure as contraband or otherwise. The reason for the rule is the
probability that seizure will be impossible if a warrant is obtained, because of the mobility
of the vehicle. Hence the limitation to a 'moving or readily movable vehicle."' ALI MODEL
CODE OF PRE-ARRGNMENT PROCEDURE § SS 260.3 (1975).
39. 399 U.S. at 52.
40. 8 Cal. 3d 192, 501 P.2d 1145, 104 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1972).
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sonable within Fourth Amendment prohibitions."41 The court does
not appear to consider that the car had been abandoned because
the suspects could not start it. Nor does it examine the likelihood
of Laursen or his accomplices risking a return to the stalled auto-
mobile "to retrieve it or to remove evidence"" 2-circumstances
that negate a finding of exigency.
In Cardwell v. Lewis4' tire treads and paint scrapings placed
Lewis' car at the scene of a murder for which he was eventually
convicted. Having driven his car to a public parking lot, Lewis was
arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant issued earlier that day. Al-
though police suspected the car of being an instrumentality of the
crime,44 they did not obtain a warrant to search the car. Neverthe-
less, Lewis' attorney released the car keys and a parking lot claim
check to the police "to avoid a physical confrontation.' 45 The car
was moved to a police impoundment lot and examined by a techni-
cian from the Bureau of Criminal Investigation.
Without concluding that a search had actually occurred, the
Court offered the Chambers-Carroll doctrine of constructive exi-
gency-continuing justification for the warrantless search. To the
argument that probable cause had existed for some time and could
not excuse failure to secure a warrant, the Court stated:
Exigent circumstances with regard to vehicles are not limited to
situations where probable cause is unforeseeable and arises only
at the time of arrest .... The exigency may arise at any time,
and the fact that the police might have obtained a warrant earlier
does not negate the possibility of a current situation's necessitat-
ing prompt police action.46
The very nature of exigency is, of course, that it may arise at
any time, but it is difficult to imagine what in the current situation
necessitated prompt police action. Despite the court's suggestion
that Lewis' arrest increased the "incentive and potential for the
car's removal,"' 7 it does not appear at all likely that the automo-
41. Id. at 201, 501 P.2d at 1151, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 431 (quoting People v. McKinnan, 7
Cal. 3d 899, 907, 500 P.2d 1097, 1103, 103 Cal. Rptr. 897, 903 (1972)).
42. 8 Cal. 3d at 202, 501 P.2d at 1151, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 431.
43. 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
44. An automobile similar to the defendant's had been observed at the scene of the
crime. The car's color was similar to the color of paint scraped from the victim's car. Lewis
had had body work done on his car on the day after the crime. Id. at 586-87.
45. Id. at 595.
46. Id. at 595-96 (citation and footnote omitted).
47. Id. at 595.
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bile was about to vanish. Body work had already been done on the
automobile, and although Lewis had known that he was a suspect,
he made no attempt to conceal the automobile or to avoid the po-
lice interview. If, then, no exigency existed to justify an on-the-
scene examination, a subsequent examination cannot be justified
without additional grounds. The ultimate conclusion is ines-
capable: the Carroll-Chambers rule should not have been applied
in Cardwell.
The California Supreme Court appears to have gone beyond
the pretexts of both constructive exigency and continuing justifica-
tion with its decision in People v. Hill.48 The facts in Hill involved
an automobile chase, a stop and arrest, a warrantless search at the
scene of the arrest on suspicion of robbery and narcotics violation,
and impoundment of the automobile at the police garage. Evidence
collected along the route of the chase and unconnected with the
original detention raised the possibility that the suspects were in-
volved in a murder. The next morning the automobile was
searched further at the police garage without a warrant. The de-
fendants appealed from murder convictions, contending that the
trial court had erred in admitting evidence obtained from the
searches.
The court upheld the various stages of the search on the
grounds that: (1) contraband had been discovered in plain view at
the time of the stop;49 (2) the legitimate precautionary pat-down
for weapons revealed items that could reasonably have been sus-
pected of being weapons;50 (3) the plain view observation of a kilo
of marijuana provided probable cause to believe the car was trans-
porting contraband and, under Carroll, justified the warrantless
search of the interior of the auto on the scene;5" (4) "[a]fter the
defendants' valid arrests, the officers properly impounded their au-
tomobile and removed it to a garage for safekeeping; ' 5 2 and (5)
because probable cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence of
a crime justified a warrantless search on the highway, a subsequent
warrantless search at the garage was justified by the continuing
probable cause theory of Chambers.5 3 The court was not daunted
48. 12 Cal. 3d 731, 528 P.2d 1, 117 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1974).
49. Id. at 748, 528 P.2d at 14, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
50. Id. at 744-47, 528 P.2d at 12-14, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 404-06.
51. Id. at 747-48, 528 P.2d at 14-15, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 406-07.
52. Id. at 749-50, 528 P.2d at 15-16, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 407-08.
53. Id. at 749-52, 528 P.2d at 16-17, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 408-09.
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by the recognition that:
the objective in conducting the [post-impoundment] search was
most likely unrelated to the offenses for which defendants had
been arrested or which resulted in the impounding of the vehicle.
This does not, however, render the search constitutionally defec-
tive. Whatever their primary motivations the police were author-
ized to conduct an intensive warrantless search of the entire auto-
mobile for evidence related to the marijuana charges. No purpose
would be subserved by requiring that when officers are authorized
to conduct a warrantless vehicular search for particular evidence
they must nevertheless obtain a warrant directing the seizure of
evidence which may relate to "other crimes.""
The court's own characterization of its holding is truly
astonishing:
This rationale does not turn on whether the probable cause to
search arose before or after the automobile is impounded. Rather,
it is only necessary that there be probable cause to search at the
time the vehicle is searched.55
As the cases have demonstrated, the requirement of probable
cause is fulfilled when officers believe the automobile is an instru-
mentality connected with criminal activity or a container of in-
criminating evidence. Facts of probable cause may develop in ad-
vance of the officer's encounter with the automobile, may arise
unexpectedly at the moment of the encounter, or may occur on the
scene through a process of elimination-that is, if officers fail to
make the expected discoveries at locations designated in a warrant,
they may be permitted to view the car as a likely possibility.
Where probable cause and exigency do not coexist or do not
exist at all, warrantless searches have been justified in a number of
inventive fashions; the courts have contrived the concept of "con-
tinuing probable cause" to justify a search that officers failed to
conduct at the scene. If, however, probable cause has dissipated by
the time the police conduct the intrusion, that circumstance need
not impede a warrantless search. The court may allow subsequent
events, unknown and unexpected at the time of the original en-
counter and arising after the impounding, to satisfy the require-
ment for the continuing probable cause.
54. Id. at 752, 528 P.2d at 17, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
55. Id. at 753, 528 P.2d at 18, 117 CaL Rptr. at 410 (footnote omitted).
September 1980]
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Automobile as Object of Scientific Examination
An automobile may become the object of scientific examina-
tion if it has been used as an instrumentality of crime, such as the
weapon in a homicide, or the scene of a kidnapping. Thus, paint
scrapings may be analyzed, blood samples studied, or tire treads
compared.
The development of the concept of an automobile as an object
or item of evidence requiring scientific examination began with the
California case of People v. Talbot." The defendant in Talbot, a
murder suspect, was arrested in his house, and his car was ex-
amined on the street where it had been parked. Blood was found
on the car's exterior, and the automobile was sealed, impounded,
and searched without a warrant. The defendant was subsequently
convicted of first degree murder. On appeal the defendant chal-
lenged the admission of the evidence, contending that removal of
the car from the scene and the subsequent search of the trunk and
seizure of the items within it were unlawful.
The California Supreme Court sustained the search without
mention of a warrant, finding it sufficient that the authorities had
engaged in "a reasonable search": "Under the circumstances, the
sealing of the trunk was the initial step taken in the process of the
scientific investigation, and the actions of the authorities with ref-
erence to the automobile were proper.
' '5
7
Three years later in People v. Teale,58 the court elaborated on
the rationale of Talbot and articulated the "itself evidence" rule.
The defendant in Teale, suspected of homicide, was arrested in
New Orleans on November 2, 1962, by FBI agents as he was enter-
ing his automobile. A pistol found on his person and the automo-
bile were seized. The car was stored for three days until California
officers claimed the car from the FBI garage. The car was sealed
and shipped by rail to California; it arrived on November 12, ten
days and 1200 miles from the arrest. Teale was confined in San
Joaquin County Jail and subsequently convicted of robbery and
murder on the basis of evidence resulting from a "scientific exami-
nation" of the car, showing that it had been at the scene of the
crime.59 No search warrant had ever been obtained.
56. 64 Cal. 2d 691, 414 P.2d 633, 51 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1966).
57. Id. at 708-09, 414 P.2d at 645, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 428-29.
58. 70 Cal. 2d 497, 450 P.2d 564, 75 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1969).
59. Id. at 508, 450 P.2d at 540, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 178. The evidence included a showing
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Starting with the assertion that "scientific examination consti-
tuted neither a search nor a seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment," e the court's analysis, upholding the admis-
sion of the evidence, continues:
[T]wo objects in the defendant's possession and control were
seized and taken from him when he was arrested. The first was a
.32 caliber automatic pistol .... The second was the automobile
itself .... Clearly the seizure of both of these objects was inci-
dental to the arrest of defendant. Both were seized as evidence
connecting defendant with the alleged crimes. Both could have
been introduced at trial as evidence. 1
The court states categorically:
We can conceive of no reason why a distinction should be drawn
between these two evidentiary objects on the basis that one is an
automobile. . .[Q]bjects properly seized [may be subject] to sci-
entific testing and examination .... [D]efendant cannot reason-
ably contend that such testing and examination was in derogation
of his Fourth Amendment rights ....
The argument blunts the essential character of an automobile as a
place rather than as an object. Furthermore, although the court
does acknowledge the theoretical distinction between the seizure of
a car which is itself evidence of a crime and one which is a
container of evidence, 3 it proceeds to allow without comment or
explanation the seizure of articles contained within the car."
Concluding that the seizure of an object as incident to an ar-
rest in the reasonable belief that the object is itself evidence of the
crime for which the arrest is made makes a subsequent examina-
tion to determine the object's evidentiary value something other
than or less than a search, 5 the court denies that its holding
that blood of the victim's type was found splattered on the automobile's interior and on a
man's jacket and shirt. Fibers on the victim's shoes's matched the fibers from the car's floor
mats. Traces of red paint taken from the car's floor mat also were found on the victim's
shoes.
60. Id. at 507, 450 P.2d at 570, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
61. Id. at 507-08, 450 P.2d at 570, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 178 (emphasis in the original).
62. Id. at 508, 450 P.2d at 570, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
63. Id. (citing People v. Webb, 66 Cal. 2d 107, 123-24 n.3, 424 P.2d 342, 353, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 902, 913 (1967)).
64. 70 Cal. 2d at 512-13 n.13, 450 P.2d at 573, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 181.
65. Id. at 511, 450 P.2d at 572, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 180. Traditionally, articles seizable
pursuant to a warrant were limited to weapons, contraband, fruits, and instrumentalities.
"Mere evidence" was exempt from seizure even with a warrant. Gouled v. United States, 255
U.S. 298 (1921). Although the distinction has been disavowed by Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967), it seems curious that the very characteristic that made an item unreachable
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"evolves from novel principles," 6 but offers the alternative obser-
vation that "even if the scientific examination undertaken on Nov-
ember 12, 1962, is considered a 'search" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, that search was clearly reasonable in light of
the totality of circumstances as a 'continuation of the search law-
fully begun at the time and place of the arrest.' ",67
Teale principles, emphasizing necessity, convenience, and
practical considerations, embellish Talbot's deference to good
police work. The court's conclusion that "scientific examination in
California was a proper continuation of the search undertaken inci-
dental to defendant's arrest,"68 offers little satisfaction. The essen-
tial question remains: what precisely is the justification for con-
ducting a "reasonable search" without obtaining the prior
authorization of a warrant?
In considering the admissibility of evidence resulting from a
scientific examination of vacuum sweepings from an automobile,
the United States Supreme Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire69
concluded that the seizure of the automobile from the driveway of
the house where the defendant was arrested and the subsequent
examination of it, both without proper warrants, were illegal intru-
sions.7 0 Although a warrant had been issued, the search was ruled
warrantless because the issuer was not a neutral and detached
magistrate7 1 but the Attorney General in charge of the investiga-
tion who later served as chief prosecutor. The Court concluded
that "the search [stood] on no firmer ground than if there had
been no warrant at all." 72
Rejecting the prosecution's additional rationales, the Court
found first that the search was not incident to the arrest because it
was not contemporaneous with the arrest.7" Nor, since the car was
immobilized, did the Carroll-Chambers theory of delayed search-
by warrant is precisely the characteristic that, under Teale, permits a warrantless seizure.
66. 70 Cal. 2d at 508, 450 P.2d at 570, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
67. Id. at 512, 450 P.2d at 573, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 181.
68. Id. at 513, 450 P.2d at 574, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
69. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
70. Id. at 484.
71. "[The] protection [of the fourth amendment] consists in requiring [probable cause
to be determined] by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
72. 403 U.S. at 453.
73. Id. at 456-57.
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fleeting target apply.' The third theory presented by the Govern-
ment was that because the police were legitimately present on Coo-
lidge's property to make an arrest and the car was an intrumental-
ity of the crime in plain view it was, therefore, seizable without a
warrant. 6 A plurality of the Court held that the officers' legitimate
presence did not necessarily justify the warrantless seizure, for
"plain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure
of evidence. '7 To satisfy the plain view doctrine, the plurality re-
quired not only that the article be immediately identifiable as evi-
dence of the crime, but that its discovery be inadvertent, a factor
not present in Coolidge.7
The Coolidge requirement of inadvertence has stirred contro-
versy. Justice White found it untenable, stating: "Officers secure a
warrant to search a house for a rifle .... [T]hey discover two
photographs of the murder victim, both in plain sight in the bed-
room .... The discovery of one photograph was inadvertent but
finding the other was anticipated. The Court would permit the
seizure of only one of the photographs."78 That, of course, is pre-
cisely the point. When officers legitimately present at a designated
place observe an object that is identifiable as fruits, contraband,
instrumentalities or evidence, they are not expected to ignore that
object or to delay the seizure. The reason is that they did not ex-
pect to find it. Therefore, they had no probable cause to secure a
warrant.
When the analysis in Coolidge is tracked over its lengthy,
wandering course, and then stripped of its pretensions, the case
stands exposed, a proponent of the basic rule that Justice White
described with such clarity. Inadvertence is simply the interface of
probable cause, "[a]nd no amount of probable cause can justify a
warrantless seizure. ' '79 Indeed, the more probable the cause, the
less justification for dispensing with the warrant.
In a case presenting facts similar to Coolidge, the California
74. Id. at 460-61.
75. Id. at 464-65.
76. Id. at 468.
77. Id. at 468-69. The Court found that the officers had engaged in a "planned war-
rantless seizure" and that there had been ample opportunity to secure a warrant. Id. at 471-
72. Justice Black agreed. "It is difficult to imagine a clearer showing of probable cause." Id.
at 501 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
78. Id. at 516 (White, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 471.
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Supreme Court dismissed the necessity for inadvertence in a plain
view seizure and upheld the admission of evidence from a scientific
examination of the automobile. North v. Superior Court80 involved
wheelspan measurements and tire impressions that placed the de-
fendant's automobile at the scene of a kidnapping. Conceding that
the car could not have been searched incident to North's arrest
inside his apartment, the court relied on the "itself evidence" rule
and characterized the event as "the seizure of evidence in plain
sight of arresting officers and therefore, after Teale, not limited to
those objects within the immediate reach of the person arrested."'81
The car was, indeed, parked on a public street but its discov-
ery was not inadvertent. The court, admitting this, disposed of the
Coolidge limitation as a plurality opinion signed by only four
members of the Court.
Justice Sullivan, author of the Teale opinion, protested that:
the majority erroneously rely upon our decision in People v.
Teale .... Crucial to our holding in Teale was the fact that the
automobile . . . was seized incident to the lawful arrest of the
defendant, who was placed under arrest while in the act of enter-
ing it .... That the automobile was in plain view when the de-
fendant in Teale was arrested never became relevant to our de-
termination .... 82
The court quite correctly characterized the North car as "the very
instrumentality used to commit the kidnapping."83 As an instru-
mentality in a kidnapping, rather than an instrumentality in
armed robbery, vehicular manslaughter, or auto theft, the car as a
means of transportation becomes the scene of the crime and the
"itself evidence" rule is thus expanded beyond the Teale limitation
on the warrantless search of the car as evidence and not as
container. As scene, situs, or place, the car used in a kidnapping
will be evidence precisely because it is a container. Rather than
being seized as evidence to be examined, it will be searched as a
dwelling is searched, for objects to be seized.
In Cardwell v. Lewis84 the intrusion occurred not with the
search, but with the seizure. The function of the automobile as
80. 8 Cal. 3d 301, 502 P.2d 1305, 104 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1972).
81. Id. at 306, 502 P.2d at 1308, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
82. 8 Cal. 3d at 314-15, 502 P.2d at 1313, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 841 (Sullivan, J.,
dissenting).
83. Id. at 306, 502 P.2d at 1307, 104 Cal. Rptr. 835.
84. 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
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murder weapon operated to limit the search because the police,
treating Lewis' car as an object rather than a place, examined only
the exterior-an examination no more intrusive than an officer's
observation from the apartment parking lot of a narcotics transac-
tion through the open window of a first floor apartment,86 the illu-
mination by flashlight of contraband on the floor of a car, 6 or the
inspection of garbage commingled in a common can.8 7 In such
cases, privacy expectations have not been demonstrated and it is
therefore unnecessary to characterize the observations as a search.
If, then, the examination of Lewis' car at the parking lot was not a
search, nothing occurred to convert it into a search at the impound
lot. The serious question is not the authority for the search but the
authority for the seizure that occurred when the car was towed
from the parking lot where Lewis had left it.
The dissenting Justices did not hesitate to find that there was
a seizure under the fourth and fourteenth amendments.88 The ma-
jority's explanation for towing the car-that "the seizure facili-
tated the type of close examination necessary" 89-is inadequate.
No particular police action is justified because it facilitates some
other action deemed necessary. Such reasoning invokes the blanket
excuse of "standard police procedure" to justify all police conduct
and misconduct.90
85. See Ponce v. Craven, 409 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1969).
86. See Marshall v. United States, 422 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1970).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Dzialak, 441 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1971).
88. 417 U.S. at 597 (Stewart, Douglas, Brennan, & Marshall, J.J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 595.
90. But see Grano, Foreward-Perplexing Questions About Three Basic Fourth
Amendment Issues: Fourth Amendment Activity, Probable Cause, and the Warrant Re-
quirement, 69 J. CRm. L.C. & P.S. 425 (Winter 1978). Professor Grano theorizes that
"[seizures as such only affect possessory property interests; they affect privacy interests
only when their purpose is a subsequent search." Id. at 461. The distinction, however, has
only the appearance of usefulness. To characterize Lewis interest in his car as property
rather than privacy does not dispose of the fourth amendment guarantee of his right to be
secure in his person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizure.
Professor Grano's citation of G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977), for
the proposition that "[w]hen possessory interests are at stake, the Court has not normally
required warrant protection" appears to be incorrect. G.M. Leasing involved the warrantless
seizure of several automobiles from public streets, parking lots and other "open places" in
partial satisfaction of a tax assessment-that is, of a legitimate claim. G.M. Leasing's reli-
ance on the holding in Murray's v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272 (1856), that the seizure of a debtor's land through a transfer of title did not require a
warrant because it did not involve an invasion of privacy suggests that G.M. Leasing may
involve no right at all-neither a privacy right nor a possessory right. It can hardly be sug-
gested that Lewis had no interest, protectible in some fashion, in the automobile the police
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Furthermore, unlike the usual case, the police did not take
custody of the Lewis car merely for safekeeping. Although Lewis
had been arrested, the car could have been released to Lewis' wife
or attorney. Such a release, however, is precisely the action the po-
lice resisted; their acquisition of the car keys and parking lot
checks appears to have been rather forceful.9 1 The police obviously
intended to examine the car. It is that intention which makes it
imperative that police present their reasons to a magistrate for an
independent evaluation. Lewis presents the rare case where the in-
trusion occurs not with the search, but with the seizure. The search
may not require a warrant; the seizure should.
Other problems remain. To justify a warrantless search on the
grounds that the car is "itself evidence" of the crime invites war-
rantless intrusions into the car as container. That is what hap-
pened in People v. Rogers.9 2 Late at night the defendant re-
sponded to a knock on the door of his van by a police officer. He
was recognized by the officer as the white male who, according to a
radio report, had attempted to molest two young males in a nearby
shopping plaza. Flashing his light into the van, the officer saw on
the floor some photographs of naked young boys. Perceiving that
the snapshots' background matched the "highly distinctive decor
of the van," 93 the officer promptly guessed that the pictures were
taken in the van, and the van became "itself evidence."
When the defendant admitted on questioning that he had
talked to some boys at the shopping plaza that afternoon, the of-
ficer arrested him for contributing to the delinquency of a minor,
debauchery, and exposing obscene materials to minors. The defen-
dant then retreated into the van to put on his trousers, and the
officer, concerned that the defendant might have a weapon handy,
followed. Once inside, the officer observed pornographic magazines
and materials and a Polaroid camera. He seized the snapshots with
the defendant's consent, and searched the van. The defendant
then was taken to the police station and booked, and the van taken
to the police garage. At that point the police seized the magazines,
paraphernalia, and a loaded revolver previously observed "in plain
view in an open box."
'9
4
towed from the parking lot.
91. 417 U.S. at 595.
92. 21 Cal. 3d 542, 579 P.2d 1048, 146 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1978).
93. Id. at 546, 579 P.2d at 1050, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 734.
94. Id.
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Once in custody, the defendant consented in writing to a
search of the van. This search yielded a letter connecting him to a
case of child molestation in California. The defendant was ulti-
mately prosecuted in California, and he challenged his convictions
on grounds that they were based on evidence resulting from an
unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the fourth
amendment.
Unanimously affirming Rogers' conviction, the California Su-
preme Court held that the warrantless searches of the van, in
which the photographs and the letter were seized, were justifiable.
The observations of the photographs on the van floor when Rogers
opened the door was "not a 'search' in the constitutional sense be-
cause they were in plain view and officer clearly had a right to be
in the position to have that view."'95 The subsequent warrantless
search of the van the court noted, was justifiable on two grounds:
first, that the defendant had consented to the search; and, second,
that
when officers, incidental to a lawful arrest, seize an automobile or
other object in the reasonable belief that the object is itself evi-
dence of the commission of the crime for which the arrest is
made, any subsequent examination of the object for the purpose
of determining its evidentiary value does not constitute a
"search" as that term is used in the California and federal Consti-
tutions .... In light of the evidence indicating that the porno-
graphic snapshots were taken in the van and might depict the
victims of the reported assaults, Officer Szatmary clearly had rea-
son to believe that the van was itself evidence of the crimes for
which defendant had been arrested.98
95. Id. at 549, 579 P.2d at 1052, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 736. Although the point is not ex-
amined, it should be noted that the legitimacy of the seizure of an object in "plain view" is
dependent on the legitimacy of the officer's presence. If the officer has no right to be pre-
sent, he or she cannot seize what is discovered, however plainly the object may appear in
view.
96. Id. at 549-50, 579 P.2d at 1053, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 737 (citing North and Teale).
Rogers does not acknowledge the supreme court's retreat from Teale. In Guidi v. Superior
Court, 10 Cal. 3d 1, 513 P.2d 908, 109 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1973), the court stated that "we
manifestly still adhere to the result reached in Teale. Nevertheless... we have since Teale
departed from the rationale expressed therein for upholding the inspection in that case of
an object lawfully seized as evidence .... Thus the inspection of the vehicle in Teale was
justifiable not because it fell outside the Fourth Amendment, but because that inspection,
although a 'search,' was consistent with the reasonableness required by the Fourth Amend-
ment." Id. at 18-19 n.19, 513 P.2d at 920, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 696-97 (citations omitted). Guidi
ignores the warrant clause. "The seizure of the vehicle [in Teale] was premised on the rea-
sonable supposition that it had been the site of a homicide. The only way to verify this
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To concede the legitimacy of the seizure and viewing of the
snapshots and the reasonableness and truthfulness of the officer's
conclusion that, under the circumstances, the van was "itself evi-
dence" does not terminate the inquiry. To state the word "automo-
bile" as the court does, almost parenthetically, and then to charac-
terize it as an object in order to justify its examination as evidence,
diminishes the significance of the automobile as a place. To pro-
ceed to the assertion that an examination of an automobile is not a
search does not alter the conclusion that the "search" of a place
"as that term is used in the California and federal Constitutions"97
cannot be other than a search even if it is called an examination.
Furthermore, the court does not discuss the gap between the
seizure of Rogers' van as "itself evidence" and the seizure of the
letters and photographs contained in the van. In no sense can the
latter be justified as the result of an "examination" of the automo-
bile. The conclusion in Rogers that the "itself evidence" rule per-
mits the warrantless seizure of evidence from within a van merely
because the van is movable is an overbroad extension of the rule.
This interpretation permits the warrantless search of virtually any
automobile connected with a crime in California, even when that
automobile is used as a residence.9 8
Where a court has found probable cause to believe that an au-
tomobile is "itself evidence" of a crime, it has contrived to extri-
cate the search from fourth amendment proscriptions by charac-
terizing it as a scientific examination rather than as a search. Once
the car is seized and removed from the scene, the pretense of sci-
entific examination is abandoned and the search is now called a
"continuation of the search undertaken incidental to defendant's
supposition was to subject the vehicle to thorough examination by a criminalist." Id.
97. 21 Cal. 3d at 549-50, 579 P.2d at 1053, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 737.
98. Although Rogers has been ignored by the California Supreme Court, it has made
its mark on the court of appeal. In People v. Young, 85 Cal. App. 3d 594, 149 Cal. Rptr. 524
(1978), the defendant was arrested in an automobile bearing the license number of a get-
away car used in a liquor store robbery. The car was impounded, and fingerprints of two
other defendants were lifted from both inside and outside the car. Stating that the circum-
stances did not present a search incident to arrest, a probable cause search on exigency, or
an inventory search, the court nevertheless found that "[s]eizing the black and white auto-
mobile as evidence incident to the arrest was certainly reasonable" under Teale. Id. at 601,
149 Cal. Rptr. at 528 (emphasis added). The court found that Teale had been "reaffirmed,
followed and extended [in Rogers] to include a crucial incriminating letter seized from a
suspect van without the requirement of a search warrant ... by a unanimous Supreme
Court." Id. Young might have disposed of the matter more simply on the grounds that
lifting fingerprints is not a seizure.
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arrest." 99 Unfortunately, the rule has resulted in contradictory di-
rectives: (1) the car may be examined only as "itself evidence"; the
car, examined as evidence, may be searched as a container of evi-
dence; (2) only the car's exterior may be examined; the entire car,
including the trunk, may be searched; (3) officers may not seize the
car as evidence unless the seizure is incident to the suspect's ar-
rest; the seizure may be justified as a plain view observation of
evidence and so may exceed the scope of an arrest-search; (4) prob-
able cause will justify the seizure of the car as "itself evidence" if
the car is in plain view; if however, probable cause to believe the
car is evidence of criminal activity precedes the plain view observa-
tion, that circumstance may prohibit a warrantless seizure.
Caretaking Function of Police
As a means of transportation, the automobile travels the public
highways, subjected to public scrutiny and governmental regula-
tion. A natural consequence is that privacy expectations in an au-
tomobile are diminished. Nonetheless, permissible intrusions must
be correspondingly minimal. In Harris v. United States,100 the de-
fendant's car was impounded, towed to the precinct garage, and
searched, pursuant to a regulation of the District of Columbia po-
lice department requiring a search, inventory, and removal of valu-
ables from all vehicles taken into custody.1'0 The "search," how-
ever, was nothing more than a "plain view" discovery.
[T]he windows of the car were open and the door unlocked. It
had begun to rain ....
The officer entered on the driver's side, searched the car, and
tied a property tag on the steering wheel. Stepping out of the car,
he rolled up an open window on one of the back doors. Proceed-
ing to the front door on the passenger side, the officer opened the
door in order to secure the window and door. He then saw the
registration card, which lay face up on the metal stripping over
which the door closes.
10 2
The Court held that the discovery of the card was not the re-
sult of a search "but of a measure taken to protect the car while it
was in police custody .... Once the door had lawfully been
99. See People v. Teale, 70 Cal. 2d 497, 513, 450 P.2d 564, 574, 75 Cal. Rptr. 172, 182
(1969).
100. 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (per curiam).
101. Id. at 235.
102. Id. at 235-36.
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opened, the registration card, with the name of the robbery victim
on it, was plainly visible."10'
Harris was the first case to rely on the theory of police-care-
taker safeguarding the car to justify the seizure of evidence from
the automobile. The decision is a narrow one. It does not address
the validity of a search authorized by the police regulation. It sim-
ply restates the traditional plain view doctrine: the officer was law-
fully present at the designated place; his view of the evidence
therefore was "plain" and the seizure justified.
In Cooper v. California,"" the defendant's car was seized pur-
suant to a statute that vehicles used in the commission of narcotics
offenses be held as evidence pending the outcome of forfeiture pro-
ceedings.10 5 One week later, a warrantless search produced evi-
dence resulting in Cooper's conviction.
The United States Supreme Court reasoned that the search in
Cooper was permissible because the agents, having acquired lawful
custody of the car had, by that event, also acquired the right to
search it.
[T]he officers seized petitioner's car because they were required
to do so by state law. They seized it because of the crime for
which they arrested petitioner. They seized it to impound it and
they had to keep it until forfeiture proceedings were concluded.
Their subsequent search of the car ... was closely related to the
reason petitioner was arrested, the reason his car had been im-
pounded, and the reason it was being retained.10 6
Perceiving the implication of Preston v. United States10 7 and at-
tempting to distinguish that case, the Court offers a non sequitur:
"the fact that the police had custody of Preston's car was totally
unrelated to the vagrancy charge for which they arrested him. So
was their subsequent search of the car."10 8
Whatever its relationship to Preston's offense, police custody
103. Id. at 236.
104. 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
105. Id. at 60.
106. Id. at 61.
107. 376 U.S. 364 (1964). In Preston, the petitioners and two companions who had
been seated in a parked car were arrested for vagrancy and searched for weapons. The car
was taken to the police garage. It was subsequently searched leading to the discovery of
various articles which later were used as evidence in the petitioner's trial. The Court held
that the evidence seized was inadmissible because, being too remote in time or place to be
treated as incidental to arrest, it failed to meet the test of reasonableness under the fourth
amendment. Id. at 368.
108. 386 U.S. at 61.
[Vol. 32
AUTOMOBILE SEARCH
of the automobile in that case was as lawful as if it had been au-
thorized by statute. Indeed, it was necessary. Preston and his two
associates had been arrested. There was no one to assume respon-
sibility for the car and no alternative except an inappropriate one:
to leave the car unprotected on a public street. Preston presents
the familiar case where an arrest disables the car's owner and it
becomes the police officer's duty to assume control as caretaker of
the car. Whether or not the right to search attaches at that point is
another matter.
The Cooper Court finds time significant:
The forfeiture of petitioner's car did not take place until over
four months after it was lawfully seized. It would be unreasonable
to hold that the police, having to retain the car in their custody
for such a length of time had no right, even for their own protec-
tion, to search it.109
Actually, the police did not know they would retain the Cooper car
for four months, and they presumably would never know how long
their custody would continue. In any event, Cooper's car was not
searched for a week after it had been impounded. If the Court's
concern is that the police, having assumed control of a motor vehi-
cle, must take safekeeping measures to protect themselves from ex-
plosives, to protect the public from the intruder who makes off
with weapons, or to protect the car's owner from theft,110 then cars
in lawful police custody should not only be searched, they should
be searched immediately. If that is the case, however, the warrant-
less search of all cars in lawful police custody would seem to be
categorically justifiable without resort to any other precisely delin-
eated theory.""
In Cady v. Dombrowski,112 the defendant's disabled car was
towed after an accident, and Dombrowski, a Chicago police officer,
was formally arrested for drunk driving and taken to a hospital. A
search of his person failed to disclose the service revolver which
authorities believed was carried at all times by Chicago police. De-
spite police persistence, the revolver was never found. A warrant-
less search of the car's interior uncovered a blood-spattered
109. Id. at 61-62.
110. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
111. Some members of the Court believe precisely that. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussed in notes 135-37 & accompanying text
infra). See also note 81 supra.
112. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
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flashlight. Still without warrant, the police continued their search
into the trunk and recovered other blood-stained objects. Dom-
broswki subsequently was convicted of first degree murder.
Inquiring into the legitimacy of the initial warrantless search
of the automobile, the United States Supreme Court endorsed the
consensus that, although a warrantless search of homes and offices
is per se unreasonable, automobiles present a different problem be-
cause they are extensively regulated by the state.1 8
The Court's initial inquiry was whether the search of the car
was unreasonable simply because the authorities had not obtained
a warrant.11 4 Analogizing the car to an "abandoned" vehicle
presenting a "nuisance" to the public,1 the Court developed the
idea suggested in Harris that the search was not a search at all but
an exercise of the police caretaking function, "totally divorced
from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relat-
ing to the violation of a criminal statute."1 6 Specifically, "the
search of the trunk to retrieve the revolver was 'standard proce-
dure'. . . to protect the public from the possibility that a revolver
would fall into untrained or perhaps malicious hands."
' '
Concluding that the absence of the warrant did not render the
intrusion into the car unreasonable per se, the Court inquired
whether the search met fourth amendment standards of reasona-
bleness. The Court found that "[WIhere, as here, the trunk of an
automobile, which the officer reasonably believed to contain a gun,
was vulnerable to intrusion by vandals ... the search was not
'unreasonable' within the meaning of the ... [Fourth]
Amendment."'1 8
The dissent remained unpersuaded. "The police knew what
they were looking for and had ample opportunity to obtain a war-
rant."11 9 The possibility that the police did know what they were
looking for, had ample opportunity to present their findings to a
magistrate, and failed to do so lurks behind the'Court's feeble ex-
planation that "[a]lthough the trunk was locked, the car was left
outside, [at a private garage] seven miles from the police station,
113. Id. at 440-41.
114. Id. at 442. -
115. Id. at 447.
116. Id. at 441.
117. Id. at 443.
118. Id. at 448.
119. Id. at 453 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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...and no guard was posted over it. ' 120 If the dissent is correct,
Cady is really a case of the "constable blundering." If the dissent
is mistaken and the police did not know what they were looking for
and had nothing approaching probable cause to present a magis-
trate, the blunder is even more egregious.
Confronted with the evidence seized from his automobile,
Dombrowski asked for counsel. The appointed counsel subse-
quently reported the location of a body and another car at Dom-
browski's brother's farm. A subsequent search, pursuant to war-
rant, resulted in the discovery of additional evidence prompting
the Wisconsin Supreme Court to comment: "[W]e have seldom
seen a stronger collection of [circumstantial] evidence assembled
and presented by the prosecution.""12
It is difficult to determine whether the defendant would have
been convicted had the Court declared the initial seizure illegal,
thus casting doubt on the later discoveries. The Court's decision to
view the police action not as part of a criminal investigation but as
within the function of caretakers and protectors of the public de-
riving from "the extensive regulation of motor vehicles .. .and
...the extent of police-citizen contact involving automobiles
'122
conclusively foreclosed review on that basis.
In South Dakota v. Opperman,1 2S the defendant's automobile,
illegally parked in downtown Vermillion, was ticketed twice in a
single morning and then towed to the city impound lot pursuant to
a local ordinance. The contents of the car were inventoried, and
the discovery of marijuana in the unlocked glove compartment re-
sulted in Opperman's conviction for possession of marijuana. The
Supreme Court, affirming the conviction, upheld the seizure of the
car and its contents on the grounds that the police had unques-
tioned authority to remove the vehicle from the street and that the
inventory was a routine, reasonable, and necessary aspect of the
police caretaking function, conducted strictly in accordance with
police department regulations. "[The] procedures developed in re-
sponse to three distinct needs: the protection of the owner's prop-
erty while it remains in police custody; . . . the protection of the
police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property;...
120. Id. at 443.
121. State v. Dombrowski, 44 Wis. 2d 486, 507, 171 N.W.2d 349, 360 (1969).
122. Cady v. Dombrowsad, 413 U.S. at 441.
123. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
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and the protection of the police from potential danger." '124
The cases justifying automobile inventories by an officer-care-
taker rely on what appear to be eminently reasonable necessities.125
Benign as such action may seem, a serious threat is posed. The
caretaking category of the "automobile exception" provides poten-
tially limitless authority for the warrantless search of automobiles
whether impounded as instrumentalities of crime or pursuant to
motor vehicle regulations. Thus, intrusions in pursuit of evidence
of criminal activity become permissible where the facts would not
withstand probable cause analysis.
Automobile as Mere Coincidental Presence
In the course of the development of any theory, a point is
reached at which the careful theoretician pauses to take stock and
draws inward. The Court, in allowing the automobile exception to
flourish, invited the inevitable retrenchment. A group of recent
cases provided facts permitting the Court to recognize one excep-
tion to the automobile exception: when the search has nothing at
all to do with the automobile except that one happens to be
present.
In United States v. Chadwick,126 the defendant and his com-
panions were arrested as they loaded a 200-pound footlocker into
the trunk of Chadwick's car. Federal narcotics agents impounded
the footlocker and removed it to the federal building where it re-
mained in their exclusive custody. It was searched one and one-
half hours later. The agents had not secured a warrant.
On review, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's suppression of the evidence found in the footlocker. 2 7 The
Court rejected the Government's argument: (1) that automobiles
are movable effects, searchable without a warrant; (2) that movable
items of personalty are analogous to automobiles; and (3) that
movable items of personalty can be searched without a warrant.2 8
Characterizing the automobile's primary function as transpor-
tation, the Court acknowledged a superior privacy interest in lug-
124. Id. at 369.
125. See note 134 infra.
126. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
127. Id. at 6.
128. Id. at 11-13.
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gage, "intended as a repository of personal effects" '129 and thus
failed to acknowledge the automobile's inevitable function as a
repository.
The dissent dismissed the requirement of a warrant where
property is seized incident to an arrest as a mere "formality,"130
acknowledging only that a warrant would protect an "incremental"
privacy interest 8 1 in cases in which the defendant had been ar-
rested in a public place.182 Urging a simplification of the constitu-
tional law of criminal procedure to provide for warrantless searches
of containers in all such instances, the dissent appraised Chad-
wick's privacy interest in objects in his possession as "incidental"
and suggested that an arrest itself actually justifies further
intrusions. 8 -3
The suggestion raises alarming possibilities. It means that an
officer having made an arrest is invested with virtually unlimited
authority to conduct further intrusions. What is truly astonishing
is that such a result is not at all astonishing to the dissent, which
has simply engaged in the unexamined assumption that the police
have authority to exercise unlimited power: "[P]olice may establish
a routine procedure of inventorying the contents of any container
taken into custody, for reasons of security and property conserva-
tion."1'8 This statement effectively disposes of all questions of
probable cause, exigency, or scope of search incident to arrest. In-
deed, it would totally dispose of the warrant requirement as it per-
tains to automobiles.
In Arkansas v. Sanders,'8 5 police officers allowed Sanders and
his companion to carry their suitcase into a taxi and to leave the
municipal airport before stopping the cab. The suitcase was found
to contain a substantial quantity of marijuana. The United States
Supreme Court properly rejected the argument that the suitcase
could be searched without a warrant, simply because it had been
lawfully removed from the cab, on the grounds that there is "no
129. Id. at 13.
130. Id. at 20 (Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 20 n.1.
133. Id. at 20. This might be characterized as the domino theory of warrantless intru-
sion. "[T]he State contends that the police entry to arrest [the defendant] was so great an
invasion of his privacy that the additional intrusion caused by the search was constitution-
ally irrelevant." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 391 (1978).
134. 433 U.S. at 21.
135. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
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greater need for warrantless searches of luggage takefi from
automobiles than of luggage taken from other places." ' ,
Chief Justice Burger pointed out that the "relationship be-
tween the automobile and the contraband was purely coinciden-
tal.''13 7 Rational as that observation appears to be, it does not ex-
plain why the police may not open Sanders' suitcase without a
warrant but do have the authority to grope under the dashboard of
Chambers' automobile.
If Sanders and Chadwick are arrested standing outside the
Greyhound bus station, the police, with probable cause to believe
the suspects are in possession of contraband, may impound the
suitcase and the footlocker. In the absence of exigent circum-
stances, however, the police must delay their search of the contents
until they secure a warrant. 38 If Sanders and Chadwick load their
suitcase and footlocker into the car that arrives to transport them
to their destination and at that moment are arrested, the same re-
sult follows.
But consider the possibility that Sanders and Chadwick load
the footlocker into the trunk. They place the suitcase on the back
seat and are driven off. Police, following not far behind, deduce
from their "furtive gestures" that Sanders and Chadwick have seen
them. Five minutes elapse before the car is stopped, the trunk
opened, and the footlocker and suitcase searched. The results are
136. Id. at 764.
137. Id. at 767.
138. Recent circuit court decisions have followed the rule laid down in Chadwick and
applied in Sanders that, absent exigent circumstances, a warrant must be obtained prior to
a search of an arrestee's luggage once it comes under the exclusive control of the arresting
officer. See United States v. Stevie, 582 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Schleis,
582 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Berry, 560 F.2d 861 (7th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Soriano, 482 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1973). However, several circuit courts have upheld
the warrantless search of luggage and other containers as incident to a valid arrest. See
United States v. French, 545 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Eatherton, 519 F.2d
603 (1st Cir. 1975); United States v. Battle, 510 F.2d 776 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v.
Kaye, 492 F.2d 744 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Johnson, 467 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Mehciz, 437 F.2d
145 (9th Cir. 1971). In the most recent case, United States v. Garcia, 605 F.2d 349 (7th Cir.
1979), the court upheld as incident to a lawful arrest and attended by exigent circumstances
the warrantless search of the arrestee's suitcases under these unusual facts: agents at the
airport saw Garcia approach carrying two suitcases. They stopped her for questioning as she
stepped through the doorway. Garcia dropped the suitcases and the agents escorted her out
of the flow of traffic. The officers then brought the suitcases from the spot where she had
dropped them and opened them. The agents thus brought the suitcase within defendant's
control.
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unexpected: the footlocker contains bricks. The suitcase contains
nothing at all. At this point a true exigency is created because no
arrest can take place. Without some intervening reason, Chadwick
and Sanders must be released. Can the police, with probable cause
to believe the marijuana has been secreted somewhere in the car,
tear out the back seat upholstery to look for the marijuana? The
answer seems to be that these facts present no impediment to a
prompt, warrantless search of the entire interior of the car.15 9 The
alternative, after all, is that Sanders and Chadwick can be ex-
pected promptly to vanish.
Some proffered rationalizations are better than others. In Peo-
ple v. Minjares,1 40 police towed the getaway car from the scene of
the stop and opened its trunk on the grounds that the second sus-
pect was hiding there. After picking the trunk's lock, the officers
removed a zippered tote bag which proved to contain evidence of
the supermarket robbery.
The discovery of the evidence in the closed tote bag presented
an issue that must logically be separated from the bag's location in
the car. The California Supreme Court reasoned that: "[O]nce a
closed container comes under an officer's exclusive authority, an
immediate search is no longer necessary. 14'  The court also ob-
served that: "the tote bag would not have been subject to a war-
rantless search if appellant had been arrested on the street and the
bag taken from his possession [or if appellant had] been arrested
in his home.
142
139. The A.L.L would permit the search of occupants if the search of the driver and
the car does not produce the evidence expected: "Search of the Occupants. If the officer
does not find the things subject to seizure by his search of the vehicle, and if (a) the things
subject to seizure are of such a size and nature that they could be concealed on the person,
and (b) the officer has reason to suspect that one or more of the occupants of the vehicle
may have the things subject to seizure so concealed, the officer may search the suspected
occupants: Provided, That this Subsection shall not apply to individuals traveling as passen-
gers in a vehicle operating as a common carrier." ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRmGNMENT
PRocEDuRE SS 260.3(2).
If the Carroll rule is to be accepted at all, it seems both illogical and impracticable to
exempt from search the occupants themselves. If there was probable cause to believe that
they possessed something unlawful and if they were not in the vehicle, they would be liable
to arrest on probable cause. The result should not be different if they are in a vehicle,
assuming probable cause to believe that within the vehicle, whether in the trunk or in their
pockets, seizable objects will be found. However, the Court has held to the contrary. See
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587 (1948).
140. 24 Cal. 3d 410, 591 P.2d 514, 153 Cal. Rptr. 224 (1979).
141. Id. at 421, 591 P.2d at 521, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
142. Id. at 419-20, 591 P.2d at 519, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 229. Given the broad ruling of
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It is more than a mere detail, however, that the trunk of
Minjares' car was forceably opened, and the question whether the
result would have been different if the open trunk had revealed the
evidence in the officer's "plain view" can hardly be avoided. If, as
the officer who picked the lock actually testified at the initial sup-
pression hearing, the tote bag had been open and the officer saw
the jacket and gun butt protruding from the bag, would the court
have acknowledged the legitimacy of the officer's presence? The
court prompts that very question by referring to Chambers for the
propositions that "when there is justification for a warrantless
search of an automobile stopped on the highway, the search is not
invalid if undertaken later at the police station"14 and that there
is "no constitutional difference between immobilization of an auto-
mobile pending issuance of a search warrant and immediate
search."
144
The justification is invalid, however, unless there is exigency.
Is exigency established under the facts of Minjares so as to allow
the opening of the trunk? Assuming that the second suspect was
hidden in the trunk, it would have been altogether reasonable,
even imperative, for the officer to open the trunk immediately
upon stopping the car. Since the officer did not do so but instead
had the car towed, the exigency was not diminished but increased
Hill, the officers can hardly be faulted for failing to realize it was impermissible to open the
tote bag. See notes 48-55 & accompanying text supra.
In People v. Tisdale, 94 Cal. App. 3d 437, 156 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1979), a getaway car,
occupied by one of two men who had been observed at the scene of the crime, was stopped
soon after the police received a report of the incident. An inventory of the car's interior "'in
search of registration and identification of [an at-large suspect or] another suspect'" failed
to disclose the desired information. Id. at 440, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 505. The officer,
"[c]ontinuing the search for identity evidence ... opened the car's trunk, where he found
property subsequently identified as the fruits of another ... burglary." Id. The court of
appeal upheld the warrantless search, stating: "We hold that probable cause existed to be-
lieve the car was a crime instrumentality, that exigent circumstances existed... and that
the suppression motion was properly denied." Id. at 444, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 507-08. The court
found exigency in that "a first degree burglar was at large in a rural area, presumably on
foot, and therefore within a small radius of the crime scene. These facts placed a priority on
obtaining prompt identification and other leads by all reasonable, available means to effect
a possible quick capture." Id. at 443, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 507. Nor did the court find that
Minjares posed any impediment to its reliance on Hill and Laursen. "Minjares states that
the belief that an automobile was used in the perpetration of a crime merely supplies the
requisite probable cause to search the car. We construe this statement to refer, in context,
to the entire car, not just the passenger compartment." Id. at 442, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
143. 24 Cal. 3d at 416, 591 P.2d at 517, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
144. Id. at 418, 591 P.2d at 518, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
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by the passage of time. The theory of continuing probable cause,
developed in Chambers, would surely justify a speedy, warrantless
search of the trunk at the garage. Indeed, had there been any fur-
ther delay in discovering the second suspect in the trunk, it would
have been appropriate to inquire into the validity of the officer's
justification.
In Minjares, the prosecution proposed an alternative justifica-
tion, characterizing the search as within the "'instrumentality' ex-
ception"145 to the warrant requirement. The court summarily dis-
missed the idea as "inapplicable to the facts of this case.' 46 "[T]o
the extent that there is a separate 'instrumentality' exception,'
147
it is, however, completely applicable to the car driven by Minjares.
The automobile was used as the getaway car and, as such, it was
"itself evidence" of the crime for which Minjares was arrested. The
eyewitness description of the automobile and its license plate
linked Minjares to the crime in precisely the same fashion as the
description of the van with Georgia license plates linked Rogers to
his crime."48 If Rogers allows the search of an envelope in a van
because the van is "itself evidence," that theory also allows the
search of a tote bag in the trunk of a car that is "itself evidence."
Although the court has not attempted to rationalize Rogers,
California recognized the closed container exception to the auto-
mobile exception in People v. Dalton."49 The search in Dalton be-
gan as a traffic stop, but escalated when the officer observed knives
in the driver's belt and a gun wedged between the seats. After ar-
resting the driver and the passenger, the officers, responding to a
request by the passenger, pried open the trunk and found two
boxes containing a sawed-off shotgun and drugs. The police also
hammered the padlock off a large metal tool box and discovered
more contraband.
Under Minjares, Sanders, and Chadwick the California Su-
preme Court recognized "a greater privacy interest in the contents
of closed luggage than in the interior of an automobile.' ' 1 50 It noted
"that luggage, by its nature, may be more easily reduced to the
145. Id. at 421, 591 P.2d at 520, 153 CaL Rptr. at 230.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See notes 92-98 & accompanying text supra.
149. 24 Cal. 3d 850, 598 P.2d 467, 157 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1979).
150. Id. at 856, 598 P.2d at 470, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
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control of police.1 151 Therefore, a showing of exigency was required
before a warrantless search on probable cause was justified. The
court therefore found that a motion to suppress the evidence
should have been granted.
Warrants are required only for the search of closed containers
within the car-a footlocker, a closed suitcase, a zippered tote bag,
or a metal tool box.1 52 On the other hand, the entire interior of the
car, its trunk, and articles loosely held within any compartment
may be subject to a warrantless search. If the degree of privacy
expectation is in fact determinative, one may well inquire how the
policy of acknowledging privacy expectations in a car is served by
allowing the warrantless discovery of items concealed in the car out
of the public view.
Proposal
There are those who think, "you are what you drive. 15 3 Those
for whom the identification is less absolute nevertheless will ac-
knowledge the automobile as an extension to some degree of self:
expression of economic status, social class, age, sex, or degree of
audacity. Whatever its more subtle implications, the automobile is
more than a mere mode of transportation. At the very least, it also
is a repository of personal effects. "Despite the wealth of language
that privacy in automobiles is less important than in other areas,
most members of our society must frequently use automobiles to
convey undeniably private papers and effects. For example, the
work load of this court often requires judges to take their work
home."154 Writers carry manuscripts, law professors carry cartons
of anonymously numbered blue books, and, of course, criminals
carry weapons, fruits, contraband, instrumentalities, and evidence.
The balance, therefore, cannot be tipped automatically in
favor of the warrantless search. It remains necessary to determine
when the seizure and search of an automobile can be accomplished
151. Id. at 856, 598 P.2d at 471, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
152. People v. Robbins, 103 Cal. App. 3d 34, 40, 162 Cal. Rptr. 780, 783 (1980)
("bulky, fifteen pound, brick-shaped, plastic-wrapped package suggested that it contains a
specific type of contraband (a brick of marijuana)"). But see People v. Diaz, 101 Cal. App.
3d 440, 448, 161 Cal. Rptr. 645, 650 (1980) (a paper cup "possesses none of the indicia of a
repository for personal effects to which a reasonable expectation of privacy interest
attaches").
153. San Francisco Examiner-Chronicle, October 21, 1979, at 10, col. 1.
154. United States v. Edwards, 554 F.2d 1331, 1338 (5th Cir. 1977).
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without a warrant and when the event requires the judgment of a
neutral, detached magistrate to be interposed between the police
officer's sincere, well-intentioned assessment of probable cause and
the intrusion on the citizen's privacy.
This Article began by acknowledging that the automobile's
mobility created an exigency justifying warrantless searches: police
officers with probable cause to search an automobile on the open
highway must do so promptly or risk losing the "fleeting target."
If, then, exigency justified an immediate search on the highway,
there appeared to be no impediment to permitting officers to seize
the car, transport it to the police garage, and conduct a delayed
search.
The Carroll-Chambers rule, however, is not recognized by the
guidelines proposed below. When officers stop a vehicle on proba-
ble cause to believe it is or contains evidence of a crime, that prob-
able cause extends to the arrest of the driver for his or her connec-
tion with that crime. The seizure and search of the vehicle is
therefore legitimate only to the extent that the intrusion is inci-
dent to the suspect's arrest. The event of the suspect's arrest im-
mediately transforms the fleeting target into a target incapable of
flight. This exposes the automobile exception as a device without
rational basis. The automobile exception, initiated by Carroll, sub-
sequently has failed to satisfy its own imperatives.
The following guidelines are intended to serve, without oblit-
erating, the purpose of the warrant requirement-to preserve the
protection provided by the warrant without reducing the issuance
of the warrant to a pro forma event 55 and without overburdening
the police officer in the legitimate performance of his or her duties.
Intrusions Pursuant to Warrant
Seizure
When the officer has probable cause to believe a car is evi-
dence of a crime that has been committed, the officer must secure
a warrant before the car may be seized and transported to the po-
lice garage for subsequent examination. The scope of the subse-
quent examination must be limited to the exterior of the car, un-
155. "[A] true adherence to the principle that arrest and search warrants are required
whenever practicable. . . might conceivably turn the warrant procedure into even more of a
mechanical routine." 2 W. LaFave, SEARcH & SmzuPE 6 (1978).
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less the warrant authorizes a more extensive examination into the
automobile's interior. Exigent circumstances may justify a war-
rantless seizure. The automobile's potential mobility shall not
without other factors constitute a circumstance justifying a war-
rantless seizure. 56
Search
When the officer has probable cause to believe a car contains
evidence of a crime, he or she must meet the standards set forth in
the rules governing seizures. The requirement of a warrant does
not proscribe a consent search of the vehicle. If the car has been
left on a public street by escaping suspects, officers may, in their
discretion, seize articles in plain view within it, provided the dis-
covery is inadvertent and the articles are readily identifiable as




Accompanying an Automobile Stop
Where an officer makes a routine traffic stop or approaches a
driver in an automobile, the officer may conduct a limited exami-
nation of the area within the driver's immediate control on the
same justification that the officer could conduct a frisk of the
driver's person-the possibility that the person is armed and
dangerous."""
If the limited examination results in the discovery of fruits,
contraband, or evidence of a crime, the rule for traffic stops result-
ing in arrests applies.159 The scope of the search may only be ex-
tended on the authority of a warrant.10
156. For example, if a car, described by a witness to a hit-and-run accident, has been
traced to the suspect's address, officers can keep the location under surveillance until a
warrant is secured. Should it appear that the suspect is about to depart in the vehicle, a
warrantless seizure may be permissible.
157. The Laursen intrusion into the trunk of the car is beyond the scope of such a
search. See notes 40-42 & accompanying text supra.
158. The search in Wimberly went beyond the area of the suspect's control.
159. See text accompanying notes 161-63 infra.
160. Should the officers discover blood-stained clothing on the floor at the driver's
seat, the confrontation will escalate, in all probability, to an arrest justifying a limited
search. Any broader intrusion requires a warrant.
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Accompanying an Arrest
Where an officer stops a vehicle on probable cause to believe
the driver has committed a criminal offense, the officer may make
a limited search, incident to the arrest of the driver, of the driver's
person and the area of the vehicle within his or her immediate con-
trol for items legitimately seizable: weapons, contraband, fruits, in-
strumentalities, or evidence. The scope of the search may extend
to containers accessible to the driver.
The search must be conducted at the time and place of the
arrest. The search is limited to items related to the crime for which
the suspect has been arrested, and the scope of the search may not
extend beyond the area which could contain the items to be
seized."'- If the initial search reveals evidence of a crime unrelated
to the crime for which the suspect has been arrested, the scope of
the search may not be extended without a warrant. Closed contain-
ers within the vehicle may be opened and searched without a war-
rant only if there is probable cause to believe they contain seizable
items connected with the crime for which the suspect has been ar-
rested.16 2 Without probable cause to believe the containers contain
such items, they may not be opened at all because in that event a
warrant may not be secured.
Where officers find it inadvisable to search a vehicle at the
161. A search for the vehicle's registration should not lead the officers into a suitcase
on the back seat of the car. See Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
162. Assume that the officer stops the suspect on probable cause to believe he or she
had committed an armed robbery twenty minutes earlier. The suspect and the car fit the
description given by the witness. The report indicated that a twenty inch television set had
been taken. The officers may conduct a search incident to the arrest of the driver, the inte-
rior of the car, and the trunk, but the officer may not open a box the size of a small suitcase.
If, however, the officer is looking for ski gloves worn by the suspect described by the witness,
the suitcase may be opened.
If, however, the officer arrests the suspect driving his car two weeks after the robbery
took place, the scope of the search will be limited to the suspect's immediate control on the
grounds that the officer does not have probable cause to believe seizable items are being
carried in the car. If the officer discovers a balloon of heroin on the floor under the driver's
seat, that seizure does not extend the scope of an on-the-scene search. The appropriate
procedure is to seize the car and secure a warrant.
Note that a rule restricting the search to areas that can physically contain the sought
object informs the officer that he or she is expected to support his or her suspicions. This
leads to drawing subtle distinctions that may become trivial. The definition of restrictions,
however imperfect, is nonetheless a necessary limitation on the officer's authority to search
the entire car.
The container distinction adopted by Chadwick, Sanders, and Minjares, is disap-
proved. See notes 126-48 & accompanying text supra.
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place of an arrest, the vehicle may be seized and transported to the
police garage without a warrant. No subsequent search may be
conducted without a warrant unless there is specific probable cause
to believe an immediate search is required.1 13
Inventories
When, pursuant to regulations, an automobile is taken into
police custody because it has been abandoned, has been the object
of a theft, or is otherwise in need of caretaking, the police may
conduct a limited inventory of objects within the interior of the
vehicle.
Without specific reason to believe that the car contains valua-
ble or dangerous objects, neither the trunk nor closed containers
within the vehicle may be opened. 64 Where the police do not know
the identity of the car's owner, the glove compartment may be
opened for information of ownership. The plain view doctrine will
apply to all of the searches in this section. Objects discovered in
plain view may result in the securing of a search warrant but will
not extend the scope of the inventory.
Conclusion
The automobile can be an object, that is, an item of evidence
requiring scientific examination. More often, it functions as a
place, that is, a container for items of evidence. If it is an object, it
may be "examined" as a weapon is examined, but any intrusion
beyond its exterior becomes a search and transforms the automo-
bile from object to place. It is imperative that the search of an
automobile, warrantless or otherwise, must be justified, as the
search of any area is justified, according to the rules controlling the
search of any place for the seizure of objects contained within it.
163. The search in Chambers would require a warrant. See notes 35-38 & accompany-
ing text supra.
164. Opperman authorizes an inventory search of excessive breadth. See note 123 &
accompanying text supra.
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